In this paper we study a two person zero sum stochastic differential game in weak formulation. Unlike standard literature which uses strategy type of controls, the weak formulation allows us to consider the game with control against control. We shall prove the existence of game value under natural conditions. Another main feature of the paper is that we allow for non-Markovian structure, and thus the game value is a random process. We characterize the value process as the unique viscosity solution of the corresponding path dependent Bellman-Isaacs equation, a notion recently introduced by Ekren, Keller, Touzi and Zhang [14] and Ekren, Touzi and Zhang [15, 16, 17] .
Introduction
Since the seminal paper Fleming and Souganidis [19] , two person zero sum stochastic differential games have been studied extensively in the literature, see e.g. [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [7] , [13] , [18] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [27] , [34] , to mention a few. There are typically two approaches. One is to use the viscosity theory, namely to show that the value function of the game is the unique viscosity solution of the associated Bellman-Isaacs equation, and the other is to use the Backward SDE approach, which characterizes the value process as the solution to a related BSDE.
To be precise, let u and v denote the controls of the two players, B a Brownian motion, (ii) Given the existence of the game value, is there a saddle point? That is, we want to find (u * , v * ) ∈ U × V such that V 0 = J(u * , v * ) = inf v∈V J(u * , v) = sup u∈U J(u, v * ).
However, even under reasonable assumptions, the game value may not exist. We shall provide a counterexample, see Example 8.1 below, which is due to Buckdahn. To overcome the difficulty, Fleming and Souganidis [19] introduced strategy types of controls: Here α : V → U and β : U → V are so called strategies and A, B are appropriate sets of admissible strategies. Under the Isaacs condition and assuming the comparison principle for the viscosity solution of the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equation holds, [19] showed that
. This work has been extended by many authors in various aspects. In particular, Buckdahn and Li [5] defined J(u, v) via Backward SDEs, and very recently Bayraktar and Yao [1] used doubly reflected BSDEs. The main drawback of this approach, however, is that the two players have non-symmetric information, and for V ′ 0 and V ′ 0 , the roles of two players are switched. Consequently, it is less convenient to study the saddle point in this setting.
We propose to attack the problem in weak formulation, which is more convenient for proving the Dynamic Programming Principle. Note that in (1.1) the controls (u, v) actually mean u(B · ), v(B · ). Our weak formulation is equivalent to the following feedback type of controls:
Here X W,u,v · denotes the path of X W,u,v and the superscript W stands for weak formulation. Under natural assumptions, we show that the game value does exist. The advantage of the weak formulation setting is that we are using control against control, thus one can define the saddle point naturally. When there is only drift control, namely σ is independent of (u, v), one can prove the existence of saddle point under mild conditions. However, when there is diffusion control, the problem is much more involved. We shall obtain some approximate saddle point.
We remark that, when there is only drift control, the weak formulation has already been used in the literature, see Bensoussan and Lions [2] for Markovian case and Hamadene and Lepetier [21] for non-Markovian case. The former one relies on PDE arguments and the latter one uses Backward SDEs. The advantage in this case is that one can easily obtain the weak solution of SDE (1.2) by applying the Girsanov Theorem. Our general case with diffusion control has different nature. Roughly speaking, the drift control is associated with semi-linear PDEs, while the diffusion control is associate with fully nonlinear PDEs. We also note that, in a Markovian model but also with optimal stopping problem, Karatzas and Sudderth [23] studied the game problem with diffusion control in weak formulation, under certain strong conditions.
Another main feature of our paper is that we study the game in non-Markovian framework, or say in a path dependent manner. The standard approach in the literature, e.g. [19] and [5] , is to prove that the lower value and the upper value are a viscosity solution (or viscosity semi-solution) of the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equation, then by assuming the comparison principle for the viscosity solution of the PDE, one obtains the existence of the game value. These works rely on the PDE arguments and thus works only in Markovian setting. In a series of papers, Ekren, Keller, Touzi and Zhang [14] and Ekren, Touzi and Zhang [15, 16, 17] introduced a notion of viscosity solution for the so called path dependent PDEs and established its wellposedness. This enables us to extend the above approach to path dependent setting. Indeed, based on the dynamic programming principle we establish, we show that the lower value and the upper value of the game are viscosity solutions of the corresponding path dependent Bellman-Isaacs equations. Then, under the Isaacs condition and assuming the uniqueness of viscosity solutions, we characterize the game value as the unique viscosity solution of the path dependent Bellman-Isaacs equation.
Finally we remark that, due to weak formulation with diffusion control, this paper is by nature closely related to the second order BSDEs (2BSDEs, for short) introduced by Cheridito, Soner, Touzi and Vicoir [8] and Soner, Touzi and Zhang [31, 32] , and the Gexpectation introduced by Peng [29] . While more involved here, our arguments for Dynamic Programming Principle follow the idea in [31, 32] and Peng [28] . However, G-expectations and 2BSDEs involve only stochastic optimization and thus the generator is convex in terms of the hessian. Consequently, the dynamic value process is a supermartingale under each associated probability measure. For our game problem, the Bellman-Isaacs equation is nonconvex, and the value process is not a supermartingale anymore. Under additional technical conditions, we conjecture that our value process will be a semi-martingale. This requires to develop a semi-martingale theory under nonlinear expectation and to generalize the 2BSDE theory to non-convex generators. We established some norm estimates for semi-martingales in another paper Pham and Zhang [30] and will leave the general 2BSDE theory for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some preliminaries. The game problem is introduced in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5 we prove the dynamic programming principle and the viscosity property, respectively. In Section 6 we study the comparison principle for PPDEs and in Section 7 we investigate approximate saddle points. Finally some technical proofs are presented Appendix.
Preliminaries

The canonical space
Let Ω := ω ∈ C([0, T ], R d ) : ω 0 = 0 , the set of continuous paths starting from the origin, B the canonical process, F the filtration generated by B, P 0 the Wiener measure, and Λ := [0, T ] × Ω. Here and in the sequel, for notational simplicity we use 0 to denote vectors or matrices with appropriate dimensions whose components are all equal to 0. Let
, and
We define a norm on Ω and a metric on Λ as follows: for any (t, ω), (t ′ , ω ′ ) ∈ Λ,
Then (Ω, · T ) and (Λ, d ∞ ) are complete metric spaces.
We say Y ∈ U if Y is bounded from above, upper semi-continuous (u.s.c. for short) from right in t, and there exists a modulus of continuity function ρ such that for (t, ω), (t ′ , ω ′ ) ∈ Λ:
4)
and we say Y ∈ U if −Y ∈ U .
It is clear that U ∩ U = U C b (Λ). Moreover, we denote by L ∞ (Λ, R d ) the space of R dvalued processes whose components are in L ∞ (Λ), and define other similar notations in the same spirit.
We next introduce the shifted spaces. Let 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . -Let Ω t := ω ∈ C([t, T ], R d ) : ω t = 0 be the shifted canonical space; B t the shifted canonical process on Ω t ; F t the shifted filtration generated by B t , P t 0 the Wiener measure on Ω t , and Λ t := [t, T ] × Ω t .
-Define · s on Ω t , d ∞ on Λ t × Λ t , and C 0 (Λ t ) etc. in the spirit of (2.3) and Definition 2.1.
-For ω ∈ Ω s and ω ′ ∈ Ω t , define the concatenation path ω ⊗ t ω ′ ∈ Ω s by:
-Let s ∈ [0, T ) and ω ∈ Ω s . For an F s T -measurable random variable ξ, an F sprogressively measurable process X on Ω s , and t ∈ (s, T ], define the shifted F t T -measurable random variable ξ t,ω and F t -progressively measurable process X t,ω on Ω t by:
It is clear that, for any (t, ω) ∈ Λ and any Y ∈ L ∞ (Λ), we have Y t,ω ∈ L ∞ (Λ t ). Similarly the property holds for other spaces defined in Definition 2.1.
Probability measures
In this subsection we introduce the probability measures on Ω t in different formulations.
Here the superscript S stands for strong formulation. We next introduce the corresponding weak formulation. We denote a probability measure P on Ω as P W,σ,b if
Here the quadratic variation M b is under P. We remark that P W,σ,b :
where X W,σ,b is a weak solution of the following SDE (with random measurable coefficients):
In other words, we are considering feedback type of controls.
In this paper we shall use the weak formulation, which is more convenient for proving Dynamical Programming Principle. We note that, for arbitrarily given (σ, b), the SDE (2.7) may not have a weak solution, namely there is no P such that P = P W,σ,b . Let
has a unique weak solution ; [33] . We shall follow the presentation in Soner, Touzi and Zhang [31] . Let P be an arbitrary probability measure on Ω and τ be an F-stopping time. The r.c.p.d. {P τ,ω , ω ∈ Ω} satisfies:
• For each ω, P τ,ω is a probability measure on F τ (ω) T ;
• For every bounded F T -measurable random variable ξ:
The following simple lemma will be important for the proof of Dynamic Programming Principle in Section 4 below. Its proof is postponed to Appendix.
Then (σ,b) ∈ Ξ S (resp. Ξ W ), and, for i = 1, · · · , n,
Viscosity solutions of path dependent PDEs
Our notion of viscosity solutions of Path Dependent PDEs (PPDEs for short) is introduced by Ekren, Keller, Touzi and Zhang [14] for semilinear PPDE and Ekren, Touzi and Zhang [15, 16] for fully nonlinear PPDE. We follow the presentation in [15, 16] here. For any constant L > 0, denote
We remark that in P t L we do not require the uniqueness of weak solution.
Let Y ∈ C 0 (Λ). For t ∈ [0, T ), we define the right time-derivative, if it exists, as in Dupire [12] and Cont and Fournie [9] :
For the final time T , we define, whenever the following limit exists:
× Ω and any P ∈ P s ∞ , Y s,ω is a local P-semimartingale and it holds:
Next, let T denote the set of F-stopping times, and H ⊂ T the subset of those hitting times h taking the following form: for some open and convex set O ⊂ R d containing 0 and some 0 < t 0 ≤ T ,
We may define C 1,2 (Λ t ), C
1,2
b (Λ t ), T t , and H t similarly. It is clear that, for any (t, ω) and
b (Λ)), and for any h ∈ H such that h(ω) > t, we have h t,ω ∈ H t .
For any L > 0, (t, ω) ∈ Λ with t < T , and F-adapted process Y , define
We are now ready to introduce the viscosity solution of PPDEs. Consider the following PPDE with generator G:
(ii) We say Y ∈ U (resp. U ) is a viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) of PPDE (
is a viscosity solution of PPDE (2.16) if it is both a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution.
Consequently, Y is a viscosity solution of PPDE (2.16) iff there exists an L ≥ 1 such that for allL ≥ L, Y is a viscosityL-subsolution. However, we require the same L for all (t, ω).
A similar statement holds for the viscosity supersolution.
Remark 2.6 (i) In the Markovian case, namely
our definition of viscosity solution is stronger than the standard viscosity solution in PDE literature. That is, Y is a viscosity solution in our sense implies it is a viscosity solution in the standard sense as in Crandall, Ishii, and Lions [10] .
(ii) The state space Λ of PPDEs is not locally compact, and thus the standard arguments by using Ishii's lemma do not work in path dependent case. The main idea of [14, 15, 16] is to transform the definition to an optimal stopping problem in (3.2), which helps to obtain the comparison and hence the uniqueness of viscosity solutions.
3 The zero-sum game
The admissible controls
Let U and V be two Borel measurable spaces equipped with some topology. From now on we shall fix two F-progressively measurable mapping:
We shall always assume Assumption 3.1 σ and b are bounded by a constant C 0 .
For t ∈ [0, T ], let U t (resp. V t ) denote the set of U-valued (resp. V-valued), F tprogressively measurable processes u (resp. v) on Λ t . Throughout the paper, when (u, v) ∈ U t × V t is given, for any process ϕ on Λ t with appropriate dimension, we denote
We note that, from now on, the σ, b in previous section will actually be σ(t, u t , v t ) and
In particular, for the convenience of studying the BSDE later, we are considering SDE in the form
Moreover, one can easily check that there exists a P t,u,v -Brownian motion W t,u,v such that
To formulate the game problem, we shall restrict the controls to subsets U t ⊂ U t and V t ⊂ V t whose elements u and v take the following form:
is a partition, and u ij , v ij are constants.
It is clear that, for u ∈ U t , u ∈ U t if and only if u takes finitely many values. (3.6)
We have the following simple lemma whose proof is provided in Appendix for completeness.
(ii) Under Assumption 3.1, it holds U t × V t ⊂ Ξ t .
Proof. In light of (3.6), (i) is obvious. To see (ii), we notice that any pair of constant processes (u, v) is obviously in Ξ t . Then (ii) follows from repeated use of Lemma 2.2.
The Backward SDEs
Throughout the paper, we shall assume
is bounded by a constant C 0 , and uniformly continuous in (t, ω) with a modulus of continuity function ρ 0 .
(ii) f is uniformly Lipschitz in (y, z) with a Lipschitz constant L 0 .
Now for any (t, ω) ∈ Λ, (u, v) ∈ U t × V t , τ ∈ T t , and F t τ -measurable terminal condition η, recall the notation (3.1) and consider the following BSDE on [t, τ ]:
We have the following simple lemma whose proof is presented in Appendix for completeness.
Lemma 3.4 Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 (ii) hold, and
, and there exists a constant C, depending only on C 0 , L 0 , T , and the dimension d, such that
Throughout the paper, we shall use the generic constant C which depends only on C 0 , L 0 , T , and the dimension d, and may vary from line to line.
The value processes
We now fix an F T -measurable terminal condition ξ and assume throughout the paper:
Assumption 3.5 ξ is bounded by a constant C 0 , and is uniformly continuous in ω with a modulus of continuity function ρ 0 .
We now define the lower value and upper value of the game as follows:
As a direct consequence of Lemma 3.4, we have
When there is no confusion, we will simplify the notations:
Our goal of this paper is to show, under certain additional assumptions, that Y = Y and it is the unique viscosity solution of certain PPDE. See Theorem 5.1 below.
Remark 3.6 (i) In this paper we restrict our controls to U t × V t ⊂ Ξ t . We note that in general U t × V t is not in Ξ t . We may study the following problem though:
and we take the convention that, for the empty set φ,
However, we will be able to prove only partial Dynamic Programming Principle in this formulation.
(ii) Another important constraint we impose is that σ and b are independent of ω. When σ and b are random, given (t, ω) ∈ Λ, the solution X t,ω,u,v of SDE (3.3) and its distribution P t,ω,u,v will depend on ω as well. This has some subtle consequences, e.g. in Lemma 4.1 concerning the regularity of the value processes. The main difficulty is that we do not have a good stability result for feedback type of SDEs (3.3). We hope to address this issue in future research.
(iii) Note that we may get rid of the drift b by using Girsanov transformation, so all our results hold true when b is random, given that σ is independent of ω. However, to simplify the presentation we assume b is independent of ω as well.
, where,
However, we shall emphasize that the mapping from (u, v) to (ũ,ṽ) is in pairs, and it does not induce a mapping from u toũ (or from v toṽ). Remark 3.8 (i) In standard literature, see e.g. [19] and [5] , one transforms the problem into a game with strategy type of controls. That is, let α : V t → U t and β : U t → V t be appropriate strategies. One considers:
This type of control problem is in fact a principal-agent problem, see e.g. Cvitanic and Zhang [11] . In Markovian framework and under appropriate conditions, one can show that Y " = Y " and is the unique solution of the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equation.
However, in this formulation the two players have nonsymmetric informations, and the lower and upper values are defined using different information settings. In particular, it is less convenient to define saddle point in this formulation.
(ii) Our weak formulation actually has the feature of strategy type of controls. Indeed, consider the (ũ,ṽ) in Remark 3.7 again. Roughly speaking, given u, thenũ is uniquely determined by v, which is in turn uniquely determined byṽ. Thus u can be viewed as a strategy α which mapsṽ (and B) toũ. Similarly v can be viewed as a strategy β which mapsũ (and B) toṽ. Compared to the strategy against control, the advantage of weak formulation is that it is control against control and the two players have symmetric information.
Remark 3.9 When there is only drift control, namely σ is independent of (u, v), our formulation reduces to the work Hamadene and Lepeltier [21] . Under Isaacs condition, by using Girsanov transformation and comparison for BSDEs, they proved Y = Y and the existence of saddle point. We allow for both diffusion control and drift control, and we shall prove Y = Y . However, when there is diffusion control, the comparison used in [21] fails. Consequently, we are not able to follow the arguments in [21] to establish the existence of saddle point. Indeed, with the presence of diffusion control, even for stochastic optimization problem the optimal control does not seem to exist in general. We shall instead obtain some approximate saddle point in Section 7 below.
Dynamic Programming Principle
We start with the regularity of Y and Y in ω. This property is straightforward in strong formulation. Our proof here relies heavily on our assumption that σ and b are independent of ω. As pointed out in Remark 3.6 (ii), the problem is very subtle in general case and we hope to address it in some future research.
Lemma
where α and β are bounded. Apply (3.8) on the above BSDE, one obtains
Similarly one can prove the estimate for Y .
The following Dynamical Programming Principle is important for us. To prove the lemma we need a technical lemma. Its proof is standard but lengthy, and is postponed to Appendix in order not to distract our main arguments. Lemma 4.3 For any ε > 0 and t ∈ (0, T ), there exist disjoint sets {E i , i = 1, · · · , n} ⊆ F t such that
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We shall prove only the Dynamic Programming Principle for Y . The proof for Y is similar. Without loss of generality, we assume s = 0. That is, we shall prove:
(4.2)
Step 1. We first prove "≥". Fix arbitrary ε > 0 and u ∈ U 0 . Let
Now for any v ∈ V 0 , we have
Since solutions of BSDEs can be constructed via Picard iteration, one can easily check that, for any (u, v)
Then it follows from (4.4) and Lemma 2.2 that, for
Therefore, by comparison principle of BSDEs and (3.11) we have
Recall that sup (u,v)∈U 0 ×V 0 P 0,u,v Ê n ≤ ε. Applying (3.9) we get
Since v is arbitrary, this implies that
Sending ε → 0 and by the arbitrariness of u ∈ U 0 , we obtain
Step 2. We now prove "≤". Fix u ∈ U 0 in the form of (3.5), with u ij being replaced by u ij . It suffices to prove that
Without loss of generality, assume t = t i 0 for some i 0 . Notice that Y tm = ξ, then it suffices to prove
We now fix i and recall that u t = n i j=1 u ij 1 E i j for t ∈ [t i , t i+1 ). For any ε > 0, let {E k , k = 1, · · · , K} ⊂ F t i be given by Lemma 4.3. Denote E i jk := E i j ∩ E k and fix an ω jk ∈ E i jk for each (j, k). For any v ∈ V 0 , as in Step1 we have
By
Step 1, we see that
Here the constant u ij denotes the constant process. Then there exists v jk ∈ V t i such that
By Lemma 3.2 we havev ∈ V 0 . Then, noting that u
Send ε → 0, by the arbitrariness of v ∈ V 0 we prove (4.6).
Remark 4.4
If we use strong formulation with control against control, as in Remark 3.7, we can only prove the following partial Dynamic Programming Principle:
which does not lead to the desired viscosity property. That is why we use weak formulation instead of strong formulation.
We now turn to the regularity of Y and Y in t, which is required for studying their viscosity property.
Lemma 4.5 Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 hold. Then, for any 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 ≤ T and ω ∈ Ω,
7)
where ρ 1 is a modulus of continuity function defined by 
Recall from (3.11) that Y is bounded. Apply (3.9) and Lemma 4.1, we get
Note that
Plug this into (4.9) we complete the proof.
Combining Lemmas 4.2 and 4.5, it follows from standard arguments that and consider the following path dependent PDEs: .3)).
Proof. We shall only prove that Y is a viscosity solution of the PPDE (5.2). The other statement can be proved similarly.
Step 1. We first prove the viscosity supersolution property. Assume by contradiction that there exists (t, ω) and ϕ ∈ A L Y (t, ω) such that
By Remark (2.5), we can assume L is large enough as we will see later. Then there exists
Let h ∈ H t be the hitting time corresponding to ϕ in (3.2). For any ε > 0, set
By choosing ε > 0 small enough, we have h ε ≤ h. Since ϕ ∈ C 1,2 (Λ t ), there exist some constant C ϕ ≥ C 0 and modulus of continuity function ρ ϕ ≥ ρ 1 , which may depend on ϕ, such that
Now set u :=ũ ∈ U t be a constant process and let v ∈ V t be arbitrary. Fix δ > 0 and denote h δ ε := h ε ∧ (t + δ),
Then, applying the functional Itô's formula we obtain:
where |α|, |β| ≤ L 0 . By (5.4) and (5.5) we have
Recall (3.4) and define dP := M h δ ε dP t,u,v , where
Then ∆Z s dB t s + ∆ Z s β s ds is a P-martingale, and thus
By choosing L large enough, we see that P ∈ P t L . Then it follows from the definition of
Therefore, since b and β are bounded,
By (3.9) and applying Lemma 4.5 we obtain
where
Plug (5.7) and (5.8) into (5.6), we have
It is clear that lim δ→0 ρ 2 (δ) = 0. Then by first choosing ε small and then choosing δ small enough, we have
Since v is arbitrary, we get
which implies further that
This contradicts with the dynamic programming principle Theorem 4.6. Therefore, Y is a viscosity supersolution of PPDE (5.2).
Step 2. We now prove the viscosity subsolution property. Assume by contradiction that, for some L large enough, there exists (t, ω) and ϕ ∈ A L Y (t, ω) such that
Then there exists a mapping (no measurability is involved!) ψ : U → V such that, for any u ∈ U,
Comparison principle for viscosity solutions of PPDEs
In this section we study the comparison principle of PPDE (5.12), which clearly implies the uniqueness required in Theorem 5.1. We first cite a general result from [17] concerning wellposedness of PPDEs, adapting to our setting. For any (t, ω) ∈ Λ, denote the following deterministic function with parameter (t, ω):
For any ε > 0 and η ≥ 0, we denote T η := (1 + η)T , and
Consider the following localized and path-frozen PDE defined for every (t, ω) ∈ Λ:
Here ∂ t , D, D 2 are standard differential operators. We remark that Assumption 6.1 is in the spirit of Perron's approach. However, in standard literature the w in (6.4) is required only to be viscosity supersolution or subsolution, while we require it to be a classical one. To check that, we present a result concerning classical solutions of parabolic PDEs.
We first simplify the notations. Let O ⊂ R d be open, connected, bounded, and with smooth boundary. Set
Consider the following (standard) PDE in O with boundary condition h:
Then we have the following result, whose argument is standard in the literature and is communicated to us by Lihe Wang. We present its proof in Appendix for completeness.
(ii) g is continuously differentiable in (y, z, γ) with bounded derivatives; (iii) ∂ γ g ≥ c 0 I d for some c 0 > 0, and d ≤ 2. Then the PDE (6.5) has a classical solution θ ∈ C 1,2 (O).
We now have Proof. We use the notations in Assumption 6.1. By [16] Proposition 3.14, we may assume without loss of generality that
First, one can easily extend h to a uniformly continuous function on [t, ∞) × R d , still denoted as h. For any δ > 0, let g t,ω δ and h δ be smooth mollifiers of g t,ω and h such that
Apply Lemma 6.3, the following PDE has a classical solution θ δ ∈ C 1,2 (O ε,η t ):
Denote θ δ := θ δ + δ and θ δ := θ δ − δ.
Then θ δ is a classical supersolution of (E) t,ω ε,η , and thus θ ≤ θ δ . Similarly, θ ≤ θ δ . Then
Since δ > 0 is arbitrary, we conclude that θ = θ.
Approximate saddle point
In this section we discuss briefly saddle points of the game, assuming the game value exists. In our setting, it is natural to define
We remark that, if a saddle point (u * , v * ) exists, then it is straightforward to check that the game has a value
. However, even in stochastic optimization problem with diffusion control, in general the optimal control may not exist. We thus study approximate saddle points only.
We have the following simple observation: Proposition 7.3 Assume the game has a value, then it has an ε-saddle point (u ε , v ε ) for any ε > 0.
Proof. Let Y 0 = Y 0 = Y 0 be the game value. Then for any ε > 0, there exist u ε ∈ U 0 , v ε ∈ V 0 such that
In particular, this implies that
That is, (u ε , v ε ) is an ε-saddle point. Moreover, we observe that |Y 
One can check straightforwardly thatX is a strong solution to SDE (2.7) with coefficients (σ,b). On the other hand, letX be an arbitrary strong solution to SDE (2.7) with coefficients (σ,b). Then bothX andX satisfy SDE (2.7) on [0, t] with coefficients (σ, b). By the uniqueness assumption of (σ, b), we see thatX =X on [0, t], P 0 -a.s. In particular, this implies 1 E i (X) = 1 E i (X). Then for P 0 -a.e. ω ∈ Ω, there exists unique i such that
By the uniqueness assumption of (σ i , b i ), we see thatX t,ω =X t,ω , P t 0 -a.s. This implies that X =X, P 0 -a.s. and therefore, (σ,b) ∈ A S .
Finally, sinceX = X on [0, t], we have
Proof of Lemma 3.4
Recall the P t,u,v -Brownian motion W t,u,v defined in (3.4) . One may rewrite BSDE (3.7) as
Then (3.8) follows from standard BSDE arguments. Moreover, note that
where α, β are bounded. Denote
It is clear that E P t,u,v [ Γ 2 τ ] ≤ C. Then (3.9) follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 4.3
We introduce the following capacity C:
In this proof we abuse a notation a little bit by denoting B s r := B r − B s for 0 ≤ s ≤ r ≤ t.
Step 1. We first show that, for any c, δ > 0, and R > 0,
Indeed, for any (u, v) ∈ U 0 × V 0 and any 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 , since σ and b are bounded, then by (3.4) and applying the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy Inequality we get
By the definiton of C, this implies the first estimate in (8.2). Next, let 0 = t 1 < · · · < t m = t such that δ ≤ ∆t i < 2δ for all i. Then
Then, noting that m ≤ T δ , by (8.3) we have
By the definition of C we obtain the second estimate in (8.2).
Step 2. We now fix ε > 0. For the constant C in (8.2), set
Now set
Then for any ω, ω ′ ∈ E j ,
On the other hand,
For each ω ∈ max 0≤i≤m |B t i | > R + c ∩ A, we have
That is,
and therefore,
Now it follows from (8.2) that C(∩ n j=1 E c j ) ≤ ε.
Proof of Lemma 6.3
As standard in PDE literature, it suffices to provide a priori estimates. That is, we assume θ ∈ C 1,2 (O) satisfies PDE (6.5), and we shall provide estimates which depends only on the parameters in our assumptions.
(i) We first establish the estimates in the case g = g(γ). We proceed in several steps.
Step 1. We first cite a result from Ladyzenskaya et al [25] . Assume θ satisfying the following linear PDE:
where A = [a ij ] 1≤i,j≤d is required only to be measurable and 0 < c
loc , where α depends only on c 0 and C 0 .
Step 2. We next cite a result by Caffarelli [6] .
Step 3. We also need the DeGiorgi-Nash estimate: If
See, e.g., Gilbarg and Trudinger [20] Theorem 8.22.
Step 4. We now come back to the PDE (6.5) with g = g(γ). First, setθ := ∂ t θ. Differentiate both sides of (6.5) with respect to t we obtain:
,α . Now fix t. Then (6.5) becomes
By
Step 2, it suffices to show that
For this, we can only prove in the cases d = 1 or d = 2.
In the case d = 1, notice that g is strictly increasing, then D 2 θ = constant and thus θ is a parabola.
In the case d = 2, fix k = 1, 2 and denote θ k := D x k θ. Differentiate both sides of (8.4) with respect to x k :
Note that a 11 ≥ c 0 > 0. Then
For l = 1, 2, differentiate both sides of the above PDE with respect to x l and denote
In the case l = 2, this is:
That is, for any t, θ(t, ·) ∈ C 2+α . Moreover, it follows from PDE (6.5) that θ is differentiable in t and thus θ ∈ C 1,2 .
(ii). We now consider the general case where g = g(t, x, y, z, γ). We define a map 
Buckdahn's counterexample
As pointed out in Remark 3.7, a game with control against control in strong formulation may not have the game value, even if the Isaacs condition and the comparison principle for the associate Bellman-Isaacs equation hold. The following counterexample is communicated to us by Rainer Buckdahn.
Example 8.1 Let d = 2, U := {x ∈ R : |x| ≤ 1}, V := {x ∈ R : |x| ≤ 2}, and U (resp. V) be the set of F-progressively measurable U-valued (resp. V-valued) processes. Write B = (B 1 , B 2 ). Given (u, v) ∈ U × V, the controlled state process X u,v = (X 1,u , X 2,v ) is determined by: Then the Isaacs condition holds, and the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equation becomes:
It is clear that the comparison principle for the viscosity solutions of above PDE holds.
Remark 8.2 (i)
The above counterexample stays valid when α = 0, and thus the game is deterministic. We note that, even in deterministic case, our weak formulation is different from strong formulation. Indeed, the corresponding state process X W,u,v in weak formulation is: In particular, X W,2,u,v depends on u as well. Consequently, given v, one cannot define u through (8.6).
(ii) In this paper the drift coefficient is bσ, see (3.3), so the above deterministic example is not covered in our current framework. However, this assumption is mainly to ensure the wellposedness of the BSDE (3.7) . When f = 0, one may define the value processes via conditional expectations, instead of Y. Then we may consider X in the form of (1.2) and all our results, after appropriate modifications, will still hold true. In particular, the above deterministic game in weak formulation has a value.
